Introduction
International mobility and vehicle imports have triggered a safety debate on the regulation of left-hand drive (LHD) vehicles in left-driving countries. If the vehicle configuration does not fit the traffic side, large blind spot areas arise that increase road accident risk, especially when overtaking or changing lanes (for an illustration see, Figure 1 ). For example, more than 10,000 LHD heavy goods vehicles use British roads each day. These LHD trucks are highly overrepresented in UK accident data (Danton et al. 2009 ).
[ Figure 1 about here]
A pertinent question therefore is whether the control of wrong-hand drive vehicles can enhance road safety. Remarkably, regulation varies substantially across countries, ranging from total bans to virtually no limitations. Australia, Bangladesh, Kenya, New Zealand, and Singapore, for example, basically banned the import of non-vintage LHD vehicles. Similarly, right-hand drive (RHD) vehicles are not permitted in right-hand traffic countries such as Brazil, the Philippines, Taiwan, and some European countries (Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia).
Other European Union member states, however, have not imposed any regulations on RHD vehicles, including, Germany, France and Spain. Hungary and Romania allow RHD vehicles under certain conditions. In all these countries, however, wrong-hand drive vehicles are more or less uncommon.
In stark contrast, wrong-hand drive vehicles have become a major issue in emerging countries, especially in states that were once part of the Soviet Union. Cars imported from Japan are usually cheaper, come with less mileage than US or European cars, and are of higher quality 3 than Russian made cars. 1 Lower prices leads to a skyrocketing number of wrong-hand drive vehicles in countries like Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. These countries have right-hand traffic but experienced a drastic influx of cheap Japanese made RHD imports in recent years.
Georgia is the most prominent case in point. The number of imported and newly registered RHD surged astronomically and now even exceeded the number of LHD imports. By 2015,
around one out of four registered cars in Georgia was RHD. Similar trends apply to Kyrgyzstan and Russia. By December 2013, 127,383 out of 991,888 registered cars in Kyrgyzstan were RHD. In Russia, around 1.5 million cars were estimated to be RHD (3.6% of total vehicles); in some Eastern Russian regions close to Japan, RHD vehicles have a market share of up to 60%.
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Why are wrong-hand drive vehicles cheaper than their better-fitting counterparts? One major reason might be that wrong-hand drive vehicles bear higher accident risks. Car prices do only partly internalize excessive risks because wrong-hand drive vehicles impose additional safety externalities on other road users. The number of traffic accidents in Kyrgyzstan with RHD cars involved (24 %) is reported to be as twice as high as share of registered RHD vehicles (13 %).
In right-driving Canada, there is a similar safety discussion in many provinces over how to regulate imported RHD vehicles from the UK and Japan. 3 Canadian car dealers admit that RHD vehicles "[…] aren't designed for our roads, and thus pose a greater safety risk in this country than left-hand drive vehicles" (Cohen 2010) . Descriptive statistics on road accidents in Canada underpin safety concerns. Cooper et al. (2009) show that RHD vehicles share higher accident rates of 30% compared to LHD vehicles. Tardif and Baril (2009) This study aims at identifying the causal effect of wrong-side drive vehicles on road safety using a natural experiment in Sweden. Swedes drove on the left side of the road for 233 years.
For reasons of international trade and Swedish customer demand, however, "cars in Sweden typically had the steering wheel on the left, leading to many accidents, especially on narrow roads" (Hipple 2014 Imposing tough regulations on wrong-hand drive vehicles is therefore highly recommended.
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Identification
I employ the synthetic control method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010 Abadie et al. ( , 2015 in a rather new fashion; OLS and WLS difference-in-differences estimates as proposed by DeAngelo and Hansen (2014) validate the results as I will show later on. The basic idea of the synthetic control method is to construct a synthetic counterfactual for a treated unit by matching on non-treatment period trends of the outcome variable of interest.
The counterfactual is a simple weighted average of untreated control units from a proper donor pool; weights sum to one. Further (cross-sectional) matching predictors can be used to improve the comparability of counterfactual and treated units.
In the basic version of the synthetic control method, the non-treatment period is followed by the intervention period. In the Swedish case, however, this would require a donor pool of countries with widespread wrong-hand drive vehicles both before and after 1967 in order to period) to improve the fit of Sweden and "Synthetic Sweden". The selection of these variables is based on recent studies on determinants of road accidents.
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Results
Baseline
A synthetic control unit consisting of 80.1% Norway, 16.2% Finland, and 3.7% Netherlands best fits the Swedish trend in road fatalities in the right-hand traffic period after 1967. On average, 92 out of one million inhabitants died in the course of traffic accidents between 1968
and 2012 in "Synthetic Sweden" which parallels to the Swedish figures of 90 road fatalities per million capita (see , Table 1 ). Figure 2 shows also a close fit of post-1967 Sweden and its counterfactual counterpart from a time series perspective (graphs at the right-hand side of the vertical line). Finally, "Synthetic Sweden" is also highly comparable to actual Sweden in terms of further post-intervention predictors (lower part of Table 1 ). Altogether, the fitting procedure yields a reasonable control unit to Sweden.
[ Figure 4 shows the results. As expected, "Synthetic Denmark" neither differs from actual Denmark before 1967 nor after 1967. Denmark is not a cherry picked case. I apply the pseudo treatment procedure to all countries in the dataset and compute RMSPE ratios. RMSPE ratios measure to which extent the non-treatment period fit differs from the treatment period fit of the synthetic unit and the treated observation (see, e.g., Abadie et al. 2015) . Large ratios indicate substantial differences in fits.
The right-hand right graph of Figure 4 shows that the ratio for Sweden is an exceptional outlier among all other sample countries including the Nordic countries of Denmark, Norway and
Finland. Thus, Sweden is the sole European sample country that experienced an idiosyncratic shock at around 1967.
Third, I test whether results are robust to alternative estimation techniques. I perform two different difference-in-differences estimations with year and country fixed effects to validate synthetic control results and to avoid any concerns regarding the comparably large synthetic control weight of Norway. In a first set of difference-in-differences estimations, I rely on OLS and the full sample of 14 countries. Sweden is the treated unit, the 13 other countries are equally weighted. By definition, this procedure reduces the weight of Norway drastically below its synthetic control method weight of around 80 % and allows to assess the sensitivity of the counterfactual composition. As a downside, however, this procedure, may result in a violated common trend assumption. Therefore, I conduct a second set of estimations combining difference-in-differences with the synthetic control group as proposed by DeAngelo and Hansen (2014) . The basic idea is to use donor pool weights derived by the synthetic control group as observation weights in a WLS difference-in-differences regression. This allows to derive difference-in-differences inferences for a counterfactual with an even closer fit in post-1967 outcomes than in unweighted OLS regressions. OLS and WLS difference-in-differences estimations therefore differ in the usage of regression weights; both sets of estimations are specified as follows: Table 2 compares the results of the synthetic control method (columns (1) to (3)) to OLS and WLS difference-in-differences estimations. Column (4) shows that the OLS difference-indifferences coefficient for pre-treatment Sweden amounts to 56.7 road fatalities per million capita which is larger than the synthetic control method findings (40.6 road fatalities per million capita, column (1)). By contrast, if using synthetic control weights in a WLS estimation, post-1967 effects (31.5 fatalities per million capita) are smaller compared to synthetic control group results. Both OLS and WLS estimates are at least significant at the 5% level. By contrast, neither seatbelt nor speed limit legislation predict road fatalities. Difference-in-differences estimates for road accidents and road injuries per million capita do also corroborate synthetic control findings (compare columns (2), (5) and (8) in Table 2 for road accidents, and columns (3), (6) and (9) for injuries). Difference-in-differences estimates fairly reproduce the synthetic control group findings for road accidents whereas difference-in-differences for road injuries are somewhat smaller than the related synthetic control findings. All OLS and WLS difference-indifferences coefficients, however, turn out to be statistically different from zero. In conclusion, I can exclude that the composition of the counterfactual, i.e., the comparably large synthetic control weight of Norway, drives the results.
Excluding other channels
The main assumption of the synthetic control method is the absence of simultaneous policy changes other than the treatment of interest. In the following section, I show that neither speed limit legislation, public transport, nor accidents caused by tourists drive the results.
Speed limit legislation
Around 1967/1968, Sweden did not only change to right-hand traffic but also extended its highway summer speed limit to an all-season general speed limit (Evans 1985) . Speed limit legislation thus overlap with the traffic side change to some extent which may seriously challenge the results. I use speed limit legislation in the synthetic control method as predictor which should reduce biases to some extent. However, I present four further reasons why decreases in road accidents are likely to be caused by the traffic side switch and not by speed limits.
First, if all-season speed limit legislation would have been effective, we would expect that the relative share of winter accidents decrease and the share of summer accidents increase -compared to summer speed limit times. To test this consideration, I collect data on the monthly distribution of road fatalities in Sweden just before and after the traffic side switch. Figure 5 shows that the monthly distribution of road fatalities hardly changed after the speed limits were rolled over to the entire year. The share of road fatalities in June and July somewhat increase under the all-season speed limits but the share for August and September decreased. This finding does not suggest that speed limit legislation drive accidents.
[ I compute the difference between both types of vehicles in the annual growth rates of road causalities per million capita. Figure 7 show the results of this procedure for the period before 13 1967 and after 1967 comparing Sweden to Norway. Bars larger than zero show that car related road causalities per capita increase faster than road causalities by motorcycles for all years.
After 1967, this differential was at 0.8 to 0.9 percentage points in Sweden and in Norway. In
Norway, we observe a comparable differential also before 1967 (0.9 %). In pre-1967 Sweden, by contrast, road causalities of car passengers grew around 10 % faster than road causalities of motorcycles. Thus, Swedish cars were exposed to a drastically higher increase in causality risk before 1967 compared to motorcycles. This finding of an asymmetrical effect of the pre-1967 period on cars and motorcycles gives further support to the hypothesis that results are driven by the change of the traffic side rather than by speed limits.
[ Figure 7 about here]
Fourth, and finally, difference-in-differences estimates indicate that speed limit legislation does not predict fatality figures in the dataset of 14 European countries. Table 2 shows that dummies for speed limit legislation are not significantly correlated with road fatalities and road accidents per capita. I find a significantly negative effect of speed limits on road injuries which however do not change the effect of the traffic side switch (compare columns (6) and (9) to column (3)
in Table 2 . This finding is in line with the traffic safety literature which generally acknowledges at least some accident severity reducing effects of speed limits (e.g., Elvik 2005, Vadeby and Forsman 2017) . Evidence for Scandinavian countries in the mid-1960s however is mixed because effects mainly depend on driver's compliance with speed limits; speed limits do not necessarily translate in a reduction of actual speed (see Faerdselssikkerhedskommissionen 1966 , Haight 1977 , Nilsson 1982 ; see also Heydari et al. 2014) . Moreover, recent evidence from Denmark shows that raising speed limits can even lower accident rates because risky overtaking decreases (Road Safety GB 2014) . Against this background, effects of the Swedish general speed limit legislation are far from clear and might be less important than the traffic side switch.
Altogether, I do not find evidence that the change from temporal and spatial speed limits to a general speed limit changed the distribution of road accidents across time and space. Moreover, 1967 legislation seem to have asymmetrical effects on road causalities involving cars and motorcycles. I do also find evidence that speed limit legislation predict fatality figures in the dataset of 14 European countries. Altogether, I conclude that speed limit legislation should not drive the results. 
Other safety regulations
Further safety regulations were introduced in Sweden and in the main donor pool country,
Norway, at about the same time. For example, in both countries, seat belt usage became mandatory in 1975 (see Lindgren and Stuart 1980, Assum 2003) . Other important measures, such as alcohol legislation and vehicle inspections, do not predict road accidents in Sweden and
Norway (Lindgren and Stuart 1980, Fosser 1992 side", passengers will be exposed to substantially higher accident risks. In contrast to the common LHD passenger cars, however, busses in Sweden were usually RHD before 1967.
After 1967, Sweden quickly replaced approximately 8,000 RHD busses with LHD busses.
Public transport thus always fit the traffic side, so it should not drive accident figures.
Tourism
Finally, tourists and commuters from right-driving Europe might be an issue. However, accidents involving foreigners only accounted for 2% of total accidents 1966. 11 Thus, the results are not biased by tourists.
Conclusion
I show that adjusting the traffic side to the common LHD vehicle configuration decreased road fatality, injury and accident risk in Sweden by approximately 30% which is substantial. 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 1963-1966 1968-1971 
